Ezra Klein seems to think so.
As long as we’re talking strategy, it’s also worth saying a bit about how these pieces fit together in the legislative process. There are three distinct phases left to complete: First, the bills have to clear the House and the Senate. That means going through committees, overcoming a filibuster and attaining a majority. Then they go to conference committee to be merged. Then they come back to each chamber for a final vote.
The White House has said that its primary goal is to get a bill through the Senate and through the House and to conference committee. This is where health-care reform stops being a campaign and actually does become a negotiation. It’s a fairly safe bet that the House bill will include a public option and the Senate bill will have a weak public option or some version of a co-op plan. Then the two will meet. What happens then?
Well, it looks like we’ll have to pay close attention to who’s on the conference committee. And since what comes out of this committee can’t be changed – filabustered and voted against, yes. Changed… No. Which, as Ezra points out, creates an interesting dilemma.
If three Democrats opposed the legislation and wanted to kill it, they would literally have to filibuster it (this is assuming that Democrats have 60 votes, which is not certain given Kennedy’s health). That would be a very hard thing to do at that stage in the game. It would isolate the obstructionists, ensuring funded primary challenges and the enduring enmity of the Senate leadership and the White House. Kent Conrad can say that there aren’t enough votes for a public option and imply that he’s just protecting the final bill from defeat. But is he willing to be one of those “no” votes? Is he willing to filibuster? That’s a different game indeed.
Very interesting.